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The surge in energy prices during the 1970's2 has brought about sev-
eral legal responses. Most have come through Congress or state legisla-
tures,3 but a state court recently entered the field by creating a new cause of
action which furthers the use of an alternative energy source: solar power.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, overruling virtually unanimous American
common law precedents, has recognized a private nuisance action for ob-
struction of sunlight to a landowner's solar collector.4 The decision leaves
unanswered remedial questions that will have to be faced by Wisconsin and
the other jurisdictions that follow the decision.
The case began when Maretti bought a lot adjacent to Prah's home
and proposed to build a house only a few feet away from the property line.
Prah tried to convince Maretti to build the house further from the bound-
ary line to maintain an unobstructed path for sunlight to Prah's solar col-
lector. Negotiations between the two parties broke off, and Maretti began
construction of the house. Prah sued for a temporary injunction to halt
construction.
5
The trial court granted summary judgment for Maretti on the ground
1. 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
2. The price of oil, for example, rose from $1.20 per barrel in 1970 to $38.00 in
1980. R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, ENERGY FUTURE 25, 31 (1980).
3. States responded by lowering highway speed limits. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 316.187 (West Supp. 1982). Congress enacted measures granting tax incen-
tives for conservation, see 42 U.S.C. § 6801 (Supp. V 1981), and giving the president
power to regulate building temperatures, see id § 6262.
4. 108 Wis. 2d at 225, 321 N.W.2d at 184-85.
5. Id After construction of Maretti's home, Prah amended his complaint to
include $8,000 in damages for the net present value of a claimed 5% loss in the
collector's efficiency due to Maretti's chimney. Prah also claimed that the shadow
from Maretti's chimney would cause his system to freeze periodically in the winter,
causing extensive collector damage. As a consequence, he asked for another $8,000
to pay for antifreeze and structural modifications. Telephone interview with John
F. Maloney, Mulcahy & Wherry, S.C., Milwaukee, attorney for the plaintiff (Jan.
22, 1983).
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that Prah stated no claim on which relief could be granted.6 The appeals
court certified the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court as presenting an
issue of first impression: whether a landowner using solar energy has a right
to prevent blockage of sunlight by an adjacent landowner.7 The court held
that the plaintiff stated a cause of action in private nuisance.8 The case is
the first modern American decision to recognize a right to solar access
outside the area of malicious interference.9
To understand the holding in Prah, it is first necessary to examine the
history and current status of the right of solar access. Early English com-
mon law recognized the doctrine of "ancient lights," a right of solar access
through a negative prescriptive easement for sunlight.' 0 A prescriptive
easement is established by use of the easement continuously and adversely
for a prescribed number of years."1 Under ancient lights, a landowner who
maintained access to sunlight for the prescriptive period acquired a right to
that sunlight.2
Some early American decisions followed the English common law doc-
6. 108 Wis. 2d at 226, 321 N.W.2d at 184-85.
7. Filing briefs as amicus curiae, both the Justice Department and the Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council argued for adoption of a right of solar access. d at
224, 321 N.W.2d at 184-85.
8. Id at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
9. An interesting recent case following the traditional American view re-
jecting a right of solar access is Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-
five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). In that case the owner of a
Florida beachfront hotel sued to prevent construction of an adjoining hotel. The
plaintiff alleged that the proposed 22-story structure would cast a shadow on his
beach property and deprive him of guests. The plaintiff argued for application of
the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (one must use his property so as not to
injure another). Id at 359. The court rejected the argument, holding that the
maxim only applied to injuries to the rights of another. Since the plaintiff had no
right to sunlight, he could not recover. Id
10. See generally Pfeiffer, Ancient Lights: Legal Protection ofAccess to Solar Energy, 68
A.B.A. J. 288 (1982).
11. See, e.g., Stein v. Houck, 56 Ind. 65 (1877); see generally 3 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 413, at 34-104 (rev. ed. 1979); RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY §§ 457-460 (1944). The biggest problem in applying prescriptive easements
to solar access is determining how the use of light and air is "adverse" to the party
against whom the easement is asserted. In Prah, for instance, Prah would have no
cause of action against Maretti for obstruction of "Prah's" sunlight; the light was
not actually Prah's until it entered his land. Professor Powell does not believe that
a blockage of light alone can give rise to a negative prescriptive easement. 3 R.
POWELL, supra, § 413, at 34-119.
12. See, e.g., Palmer v. Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122, 83 Eng. Rep. 329 (K.B. 1663). The
modem English doctrine is governed by statute and provides for a 20-year prescrip-
tive period. The Rights of Light Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 56. The use must be
open, apparent, notorious, adverse, uninterrupted, and under a claim of right. 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.53-.58 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
[Vol. 48
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trine,"3 but an 1838 New York case, Parker v. Foote,14 signalled an end to its
acceptance in the United States. 5 The Parker court gave three reasons for
rejecting the doctrine. First, ancient lights impeded land development., 6 If
two landowners built on either side of a vacant lot, the owner of the middle
lot would be precluded from building because he would obstruct sunlight to
at least one of the adjacent buildings.1'7 The rapid growth of American
cities during the nineteenth century increased the importance of un-
restricted land development.1 8 Second, sunlight's chief uses in the early
nineteenth century were illumination and aesthetic enjoyment. Sunlight
for illumination became less important after the use of artificial lighting
became common, 19 and American courts did not consider mere aesthetics a
13. See Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217, 224 (1854); Story v. Odin, 12 Mass. 157,
160 (1815); Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57, 66 (1838); see a/so McReady v.
Thompson, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 131 (1837) (unreasonable for man to build house with
windows facing open field and later be deprived of light to those windows).
14. 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. 1838).
15. TheParker opinion was cited often as courts ruled against the ancient lights
doctrine in succeeding years. See Tinker v. Forbes, 136 Ill. 221, 225, 26 N.E. 503,
505 (1891); Rogers v. Sawin, 76 Mass. 376, 379 (1875); Klein v. Gehrung, 25 Tex.
232, 234 (1860). Today, the "English doctrine of 'ancient lights' has been unani-
mously repudiated in this country." Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five
Twenty-five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 358-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). See also RKO
Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 436 F.2d 1297,
1300 (3d Cir. 1970); Cain v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 574,
579, 325 N.E.2d 799, 804 (1975); Piccirilli v. Groccia, 114 R.I. 36, 39, 327 A.2d 834,
837 (1974). For statutory abolition of the doctrine of ancient lights, see GA. CODE
ANN. § 85-1201 (1978) (prohibiting prescriptive easements of light); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 34-7-3 (1970) (prohibiting easements of light). Neither of these statutes would
preclude the type of nuisance right found in Prah. See generaly Comment, Solar
Rights: Guaranteeing a Place in the Sun, 57 OR. L. REv. 94 (1977).
A doctrine similar to ancient lights still flourishes in one state, however. Loui-
siana, a civil law jurisdiction, allows a praedial servitude right in air and light simi-
lar to ancient lights. A praedial servitude resembles a common law easement. See
Goodwin v. Alexander, 105 La. 658, 659, 30 So. 102, 103 (1905); LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. arts. 674, 711, 715, 717, 782 (West 1952); see generally Comment, Adjoining
Landowners: Right to Light and Air-Injunction, 34 TUL. L. REv. 599 (1960).
16. 19 Wend. at 317.
17. See, e.g., McReady v. Thompson, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 131 (1837).
18. See Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57, 62 (1838) ("and yet in populous
cities, where land is very valuable. . . the enforcement of the same rule might work
great inconvenience and injustice"). England, of course, also had growing cities.
To ensure that ancient lights would not unreasonably restrict growth, English
courts imposed a reasonableness or "grumple-line" test for applying ancient lights.
See Colls v. Home & Colonial Stores, Ltd., 1904 A.C. 179, 182 ("application of. ..
[ancient lights] would render it almost impossible for a town to grow").
19. The electric light bulb was invented around 1870. 10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITTANICA 958 (1978).
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valid reason for ancient lights.2 ° Third, the court believed that a land-
owner had the right to use his property as he saw fit." Violation of moral
obligations to the landowner's neighbors did not overcome the owner's sov-
ereign right to the unrestricted use of his property.
The Parker court, like most American courts, did not reject absolutely
the principle of solar rights. These jurisdictions recognized the "spite fence"
doctrine: a cause of action for malicious obstruction of light. 2 Under the
spite fence doctrine, a tall fence could be built for the benefit of the builder
(the servient holder), but it would be enjoined if built solely to injure the
person whose access to sunlight was hampered (the dominant holder).2 3
Courts using the spite fence doctrine recognized a nuisance cause of action,
generally finding the servient owner's conduct to be wholly lacking in
utility.
24
Some courts refused to adopt the spite fence doctrine, holding that
malice alone was not enough to establish a cause of action; the defendant
had to invade a legally protected right.2 5 Since the dominant holder had
20. See, e.g., Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316, 323 (1875) ("it would seem that...
[land] ought not to be hampered or embarrassed in its legitimate use by anything so
impalpable and fleeting as air and light").
21. 19 Wend. at 317. Wisconsin originally had such a doctrine as well. See
Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N.W. 308 (1900).
22. See Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 383, 37 N.W. 838, 842 (1888); Annot., 80
A.L.R.3d 962 (1977). A majority of jurisdictions have adopted the spite fence doc-
trine. See, e.g., Brittingham v. Robertson, 280 A.2d 741, 744 (Del. 1971); Hornsby v.
Smith, 191 Ga. 491, 493, 13 S.E.2d 20, 21 (1941); Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 95
Idaho 367, 368, 509 P.2d 785, 787 (1973); Erickson v. Hudson, 70 Wyo. 317, 327,
249 P.2d 523, 532 (1952). No Missouri appellate court has decided whether mali-
cious obstruction of light is actionable. Dicta in one case, however, indicates that
Missouri does not recognize such a cause of action:
[T]he petition does not base any right to light and air on prescription,
contract, covenant or grant. Hence it is not seen how a cause of action has
been stated based on such deprivation. And this too, without regard to
defendant's motives. If a right is not infringed upon, no one is injured or
damnified, legally speaking, and in such cases motives are not material.
Stroup v. Rauschelpach, 217 Mo. App. 239, 240, 261 S.W. 346, 347 (K.C. 1925).
Some states have adopted the spite fence doctrine by statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 841.4 (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-480, -570 (West 1960);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 49, § 21 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1958); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 476.2 (1968).
23. Cf. Racich v. Mastrovich, 65 S.D. 321, 322, 273 N.W. 660, 661 (1937) (pic-
ture of spite fence). In England, erection of a spite fence would toll the prescriptive
period. Later, Parliament allowed landowners to toll the prescriptive period by
filing a notice. The Rights of Light Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 56.
24. See Brittingham v. Robertson, 280 A.2d 741, 744 (Del. 1971); Sundowner,
Inc. v. King, 95 Idaho 367, 368, 509 P.2d 785, 787 (1973).
25. See Harrison v. Langlinais, 312 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
[Vol. 48
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no right to unobstructed light, these courts held that the servient owner did
not invade the dominant owner's protected rights.26 Loud noises and bad
odors, recognized as bases for nuisance actions, were distinguished from ob-
struction of light on the ground that a person who produced noise or odors
invaded his neighbor's land, while a person who blocked sunlight merely
prevented light from reaching that land.2 7
In reaching its decision, the Prah court expanded the spite fence doc-
trine 28 and refuted each of Parker's reasons for rejecting ancient lights.
First, the right of modern landowners to unrestricted use of their land has
become limited by zoning laws and other use restrictions unknown in
1838.29 Property rights of individual landowners thus no longer constitute
a valid reason for denying solar access. 30 Second, the court reasoned that
26. See Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 75, 42 N.E. 765, 767 (1896).
27. "A man may be compelled to keep his gas, smoke, odors, and noise at
home, but he cannot be compelled to send his light and air abroad." Id.
28. The Prah court's use of the spite fence doctrine is important. The doctrine
provided the only private nuisance cause of action for deprivation of light prior to
Prah. A court's willingness to allow a spite fence action may reflect its amenability
to recognizing Prah's private nuisance action for solar access. Generally, three cate-
gories of courts can be distinguished. The first group includes those that allow a
spite fence cause of action when the owner's conduct is malicious and the gravity of
the harm he creates is not outweighed by the utility of his conduct. See, e.g., Bush v.
Mockett, 95 Neb. 552, 555, 145 N.W. 1001, 1003 (1914); Hay v. Stevens, 271 Or. 16,
20, 530 P.2d 37, 39 (1975); Erickson v. Hudson, 70 Wyo. 317, 320, 249 P.2d 523, 525
(1952). These courts already balance the equities in particular cases, so extension of
the spite fence doctrine to solar access in general would be relatively simple. The
second group of courts recognizes a spite fence action, but only if erection of the
fence by the servient holder lacks any utility; if the fence is even slightly useful to
the builder, there is no cause of action. See, e.g., Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381,
386, 58 So. 283, 285 (1912); Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491, 493, 13 S.E.2d 20, 21
(1941); Racich v. Mastrovich, 65 S.D. 321, 326, 273 N.W. 660, 661 (1937). These
courts do not weigh the equities. Since Prah requires such balancing, these courts
would have farther to go before adopting a solar access cause of action. The third
group of courts is made up of those that do not recognize the spite fence doctrine.
These courts find no legally protected right to sunlight. See, e.g., Triplett v. Jackson,
5 Kan. App. 777, 779, 48 P. 931, 932 (1897); Harrison v. Langlinais, 312 S.W.2d
286, 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). Before adopting a right to solar access, these courts
would have to first recognize that there may be a right to sunlight. Legislatures
may also have an impact on the question of access. Wisconsin, for example, origi-
nally rejected the spite fence doctrine in Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 271, 83
N.W. 308, 310 (1900). The legislature subsequently created a cause of action. See
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 280.08 (West 1982).
29. 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926); Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768
(1972).
30. The dissent in Prah distinguished zoning restrictions as intended solely for
benefit ofpublic health, safety, morals, or welfare. 108 Wis. 2d at 246, 321 N.W.2d
at 194 (Callow, J., dissenting). No public right was directly involved in Prah. But
1983]
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Prah was using sunlight not for visibility or aesthetics but for a source of
energy.3 1 Society values solar generation of power more than the aesthetics
of sunlight;3 2 President Carter in 1979 called for twenty percent of the na-
tion's energy to come from the sun by the year 2000. 3 The number of solar
systems currently operating demonstrates substantial public interest in pro-
viding a right of solar access.3" Third, the court stated that unhindered
development of land is no longer inherently desirable.3 ' Growing numbers
of economists have determined that the world is reaching the outer limits of
beneficial growth. 36 Laws in areas such as coal strip mining indicate soci-
ety's willingness to trade growth for other economic goals.37 The court con-
cluded that land development does not play the central role in twentieth-
century America that it did during the industrial revolution.
3 8
Once the court accepted in theory that rights to solar access should be
expanded, several different causes of action were available. One potential
theory, ancient lights, was not pleaded by the parties. Prah's house was
constructed only two years before Maretti's, so the prescriptive time limit
would not have been met. 39 In addition, ancient lights entitled the user
only to enough light to read in the middle of a room,4" far less than Prah
wanted.4 The court did not adopt ancient lights, although it based much
of its analysis on the doctrine.
The court considered, but did not decide, whether the water allocation
doctrine of prior appropriation should be applied to solar access. 42 Fol-
zoning may affect private as well as public rights; setback requirements for subdivi-
sions, for example, affect the rights of individual adjoining landowners.
31. 108 Wis. 2d at 236, 321 N.W.2d at 189.
32. The Prah court noted five separate federal acts encouraging the use of solar
energy and two Wisconsin statutes, one of which permitted localities to guarantee
access to sunlight by statute. Id. at 236 n.l1, 321 N.W.2d at 189 n.1l.
33. Burke, Solar Comes Out of the Shadows, FORTUNE, Sept. 24, 1979, at 67.
34. One estimate places the number of solar homes world-wide at 2.5 million to
3 million. P. STEADMAN, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT, AND BUILDING 82 (1975).
35. 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190 (citing State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1,
224 N.W.2d 407 (1974) (adopting private nuisance reasonable use rule for surface
water)). See also Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 575 (1876) (landowner allowed
exclusive use of property).
36. See, e.g., R. MEADOws, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH: A REPORT OF THE
CLUB OF RoME's PROJECT FOR THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND 37 (1972).
37. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1981).
38. 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190.
39. The time length for prescriptive easements in Wisconsin is 20 years, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 280.08 (West 1982), but the court could have created its own pre-
scriptive time length as courts did with earlier ancient lights cases. See Palmer v.
Fletcher, I Lev. 122, 83 Eng. Rep. 329 (K.B. 1663).
40. Back v. Stacey, 2 Car. & P. 465, 172 Eng. Rep. 210 (K.B. 1826).
41. See note 5 supra.
42. 108 Wis. 2d at 242-43, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
[Vol. 48
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lowed in many western states, prior appropriation enables the first user of
water from a watercourse to acquire a property right in a certain quantity
of water that cannot be diminished by subsequent users.43 The user must
intend to use the water and give notice of his appropriation, but the actual
taking can constitute constructive notice.'" Maretti therefore would have
had notice of Prah's solar collectors since he could see them. The appropri-
ator must also actually capture the water and put it to a beneficial use.4 5
Courts have held that domestic and culinary uses are beneficial.4 6 Presum-
ably, the use of sunlight for domestic production of energy would also sat-
isfy the beneficial use criterion.4" Thus, under prior appropriation, Prah
would have had an absolute right of access to the amount of sunlight being
used to produce energy.
The prior appropriation system is generally statutory.48 One state,
New Mexico, has adopted a prior appropriation statute for solar access.4 9
The New Mexico statute provides for unobstructed solar access where the
sunlight is beneficially used. As long as the senior appropriator continues
43. See generally W. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER
RIGHTS IN THE WEST 298-313 (1942).
44. See Four Counties Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conserv.
Dist., 161 Colo. 416, 421,425 P.2d 259, 261 (1967),cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1049 (1968).
45. The term "beneficial use" has never clearly been defined:
The usual purposes for which rights to the use of water may be ac-
quired are mining, manufacturing and industrial uses generally, develop-
ment of hydro-electric power, propagation of fish, irrigation, stock-
watering, municipal, and domestic uses. All these have been held to be
beneficial uses within the meaning of the statutory term. There can be
little question about any proposed use which has as its object the substan-
tial benefit or improvement of the appropriator's lands. . . and which is a
reasonable use in view of all the circumstances.
W. HUTCHINS, supra note 43, at 314. Along with the traditional economic uses, the
term today "is understood to embrace aesthetic, recreational, preservational, and
pollution control purposes." W. RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 168 (1977).
46. Cf Keman v. Andrus, 6 Alaska 54, 59-60 (1918).
47. See Silver Peak Mines v. Valcalda, 79 F. 886, 891 (D. Nev. 1896); Bristor v.
Cheatham, 73 Ariz. 228, 232, 240 P.2d 185, 193 (1952).
48. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-451 (Supp. 1982-1983); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-82-101 (1973).
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-3-1 to -5 (1978). The statute grants a solar ease-
ment to the first user who appropriates for beneficial solar energy purposes:
(1) "Beneficial Use." Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure
and the limit of the solar right . . . . If the amount of the solar energy
which a solar collector user can beneficially use varies with the season of
the year, then the extent of the solar right shall vary likewise;
(2) "Prior Appropriation." In disputes involving solar rights, prior-
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that beneficial use, he retains the statutory protection.5 ° Prah urged the
Wisconsin court to adopt such a law judicially, but the court chose not to
reach a decision on the issue.
5 1
The court instead adopted the action of private nuisance to enforce the
right to solar access.52 Relying on State v. Deezz," in which the same court
had rejected the traditional common enemy rule 54 and adopted a reason-
able use rule for diffused surface water interference,5 5 the court rejected a
per se exclusion to nuisance law, saying that such exclusions could promote
unreasonable behavior.5" It drew an analogy between nuisance theories for
water and sunlight.57 The common enemy rule permits a non-malicious
landowner to divert surface water onto his neighbor's land even if the diver-
sion causes harm. Under the same analysis, a landowner could harm a
50. Id. § 47-3-3. See Comment, New Mexico's Solar Energy Act, 19 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 96 (1979).
51. 108 Wis. 2d at 229-30, 321 N.W.2d at 188. There are some problems with
using prior appropriation. The doctrine may be too inflexible since the use of the
first person laying claim to the sunlight may later become comparatively unreason-
able even though it is still beneficial to him. Under this theory, land development
could be significantly and unnecessarily impeded. For instance, a house with a
small solar collector could prevent the erection of a skyscraper, even if the larger
building would be more useful. See Davis, Eastern Water Diversion Permits: Precedents
for Missoun, 47 Mo. L. REV. 429, 453-56 (1982).
52. 108 Wis. 2d at 243, 321 N.W.2d at 191.
53. 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
54. The common enemy rule, also referred to as the common law rule, provides
that "diffused surface waters are a common enemy and may be fought off in any
way the landowner can best get rid of them, even though their diversion may injure
the adjoining landowner." W. HUTCHINS, supra note 43, at 115 (citing Miller v.
Letzerich, 121 Tex. 248, 49 S.W.2d 404 (1932)).
55. Diffused surface waters are those "which in their natural state are flowing
vagrantly over the surface of the ground [e.g., rain or flood waters], or standing in
bogs or marshes, from whatever source they may have originated." W. HUTCHINS,
supra note 43, at 110.
56. 108 Wis. 2d at 238-39 n.13, 321 N.W.2d at 190-91 n.13. The court rejected
the decision in Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., 114 So.
2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), which is discussed in note 9supra. The Prah court
felt that Fontainebleau's reasoning was not persuasive since that court "did not ex-
plain why an owner's interest in unobstructed light should not be protected or in
what manner an owner's interest in unobstructed sunlight differs from an owner's
interest in being free from obtrusive noises or smells or differs from an owner's inter-
est in unobstructed use of water." 108 Wis. 2d at 238-39 n.13, 321 N.W.2d at 190-
91 n. 13. The dissent in Prah argued that the plaintiff's solar energy heating system
was "an unusually sensitive use"; since Maretti's house would not have interfered
with a normal, non-sensitive use, it was reasonable. Id at 246, 321 N.W.2d at 197
(Callow, J., dissenting) (citing Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll
Highway Comm'n, 34 Ill. 2d 544, 547-49, 216 N.E.2d 788, 799 (1966)).
57. 108 Wis. 2d at 240, 321 N.W.2d at 190.
[Vol. 48
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neighbor by blocking sunlight to him if he did so without malice. Both
harms would be justified by the earlier importance of land development
and the landowner's right to exclusive control of his property.58 Just as the
Deetz court concluded that those rationales no longer supported the com-
mon enemy rule,59 the Prah court concluded that they no longer justified
rejection of solar access. 0
Both the Prah dissent and the commentators have criticized creation of
a private nuisance action for solar access.6 1 They argue that the action
leaves the parties uncertain of their rights until litigation is commenced.6 2
But a nuisance cause of action can overcome the problem of uncertainty.
Case law can create predictability even in an area as dependent on the facts
as solar access.63 As more cases are litigated, courts will have an opportu-
nity to shape the boundaries of the right to solar access.
The primary reason the Prah court chose private nuisance was the flex-
ibility of the action.6 4 That flexibility will be critical in the area of solar
access. Technology changes rapidly. In the future, Prah might have access
to inexpensive technology allowing him to fit his solar collector into a
smaller space, away from the shadow of Maretti's chimney. If so, the court
could permit Maretti to build his chimney after reassessing the reasonable-
ness of his conduct. That process is common in states that have adopted
58. See Morrison v. Bucksport & B.R.R., 67 Me. 353, 356 (1877).
59. 66 Wis. 2d at 21, 224 N.W.2d at 417. In the same year, Wisconsin also
adopted the comparative reasonableness test for underground water. See State v.
Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974).
60. 108 Wis. 2d at 238, 321 N.W.2d at 190.
61. See id. at 247, 321 N.W.2d at 198 (Callow, J., dissenting); Eisenstadt, Access
to Solar Energy: The Problem and its Current Status, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 21, 30
(1982); Goble, Siting=Protection, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 46, 50 (1980).
62. See Eisenstadt, supra note 61, at 30.
63. For example, the prospective owner of a Missouri funeral parlor could
know by cursory examination of the case law that a court would find his operation
of the parlor in a purely residential area unreasonable. See Leffen v. Hurlbut-
Glover Mortuary, Inc., 363 Mo. 1137, 1141, 257 S.W.2d 609, 610 (1953); accord
Howard v. Etchieson, 228 Ark. 809, 812, 310 S.W.2d 473, 474 (1958). Similarly, the
increased volume of solar access cases that are likely to follow Prah should yield a
reasonably coherent body of law that will enable persons to know when their ac-
tions are violating the rights of others.
64. 108 Wis. 2d at 237, 321 N.W.2d at 190. For instance, in the funeral parlor
example in note 63 supra, the formerly residential district could later become more
commercial. Under a prior appropriation theory, such as that used in New Mexico,
see note 49 supra, a single landowner conceivably could appropriate rights and keep
the parlor out virtually forever. Under a reasonable use nuisance theory, the court
could recognize the changed use and allow the funeral parlor to move into the
formerly residential area. The water analogy is even more forceful; if a prior water
use later becomes unreasonable-though still beneficial-a court may readjust the
rights of the parties.
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reasonable use in water law,65 where, for example, a farmer uses an anti-
quated irrigation system that wastes water.
66
The flexibility of a nuisance action is further demonstrated by its re-
sponse to existing uses. Had Maretti built his house before Prah installed
his solar collector, Prah would not have obtained relief under a prior appro-
priation theory such as New Mexico's. 7 But under a private nuisance ac-
tion, the court would consider Maretti's status as first user as only one of
several factors in a weighing process based on reasonableness.
6 8
Several states have enacted statutory remedies that courts will have to
consider when assessing the scope of the nuisance cause of action.69 In Wis-
consin, for example, legislators passed an act to deal with future solar ac-
cess.7" The statute enables municipalities to opt into a system providing for
65. See Hazard Powder v. Somersville Mfg. Co., 78 Conn. 171, 179, 61 A. 519,
522 (1905) (evidence of efficiency of other mills on stream admitted to evaluate
reasonableness of mill's use). Factors used in assessing the reasonableness of the
water use are found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979):
The determination of the reasonableness of a use of water depends upon a
consideration of the interests of the riparian proprietor making the use, of
any riparian proprietor harmed by it and of society as a whole. Factors
that affect the determination include the following:
(a) The purpose of the use,
(b) the suitability of the use to the watercourse or lake,
(c) the economic value of the use,
(d) the social value of the use,
(e) the extent and amount of the harm it causes,
() the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use or
method of one proprietor or the other,
(g) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by each
proprietor,
(h) the protection of existing values of water uses, land, investments
and enterprises, and
(i) the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear the loss.
Many of these factors, by analogy, should apply to solar access as well.
66. See Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 150 P.2d 405 (1944) (evaluation of
present use, not greater past use, is material).
67. See note 49 supra.
68. See Schlolfelt v. Vinton Farmer's Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 1115, 109
N.W.2d 695, 702 (1961); Clinic v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 234, 236 S.W.2d
384, 392 (K.C. 1951).
69. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25980 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 462.358(2) (West Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-1 (1978); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 66.032 (West Supp. 1982); see also Adams, An Analysis of Solar Legisla-
lion--Taxes and Easements, 14 LAND & WATER L. REv. 393 (1979); Johnson, State
Approaches to Solar Legislation: A Survey, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 55 (1979). Missouri's statu-
tory contribution is Mo. REV. STAT. § 441.640 (Supp. 1982), which allows creation
of solar easements.
70. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.032 (West 1982).
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solar access permits which, if violated by an adjoining landowner, would
create a cause of action. Significantly, the statute was passed after the peti-
tion in Prah was filed but before the decision was rendered, so the court
decided the case on common law principles. As a result, plaintiffs may have
the common law remedy even in Wisconsin cities which have opted into the
statutory scheme.71
Courts that follow Prah will have to fashion a remedy for obstruction of
solar access in private nuisance. Initially, courts will have to determine
whether issuance of an injunction against construction of the obstructing
building is proper. Enjoining proposed construction is difficult because the
court must be certain that the building, when constructed, actually would
obstruct light to the solar collector. In Prah, the claimed obstruction from
Maretti's house was a five percent loss of efficiency caused by a chimney;
the chimney would have been harmless had it been only eighteen inches
shorter. It may be difficult to determine from construction plans how much
obstruction would result, and a reasonable estimate seems necessary for the
issuance of an injunction. 72
After the building has been constructed, the court will examine several
factors to determine whether to issue an injunction ordering the obstruction
torn down. First, it must measure the harm to the plaintiff.73 In solar ac-
71. The passage of a statute by the legislature arguably precludes any action
with a similar remedy by the court. But a contrary argument could be made that a
statute presumptively does not remove a common law cause of action. See Huff v.
Union Elec. Co., 598 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Mo. 1980) ("decision [on a close question]
should be weighted in favor of retention of the common law right of action"). The
statute instead could be construed to clarify and provide specific guidelines for the
common law action without displacing it. See Helmcampt v. Clark Ready Mix Co.,
214 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1974) ("statutory enumerations. . . do not modify the
common law application to nuisances") (construing IOWA CODE ANN. § 657.01
(West 1950)). But see Hamms Brewing Co. v. Wiggam, 76 Minn. 246, 249, 134
N.W. 218, 220 (1912) (construing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.01 (West 1947)). For
example, a California statute states specific guidelines for the blockage of solar col-
lectors by trees. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25980 (West Supp. 1982). It provides
that for a public nuisance to exist, the trees must block more than 10% of the ad-
joining solar collector's surface between the hours of 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. If such a
statute had been enacted in Wisconsin, the legislature could be presumed to have
spoken only with regard to those specific requirements. The court would still be
free to decide any other issues regarding solar access (e.g., blockage caused by a
house).
72. See McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apts., Ltd., 25 Ariz. App. 312, 315, 543 P.2d
150, 153 (1975); Brent v. City of Detroit, 27 Mich. App. 628, 631, 183 N.W.2d 908,
910 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 (1979); Annot., 55 A.L.R.
880 (1928).
73. That harm must also be balanced against the harm to the defendant.
Under the doctrine of comparative injury, if the court finds that the burden of
removal of the obstructing structure would be grossly disproportionate to the bene-
fit to the plaintiff, the court should refuse to issue an injunction. Moore v. Serafin,
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cess, that harm is primarily monetary.74 The primary detriment to the
plaintiff will be an increase in his utility bills and the loss of his investment
in the solar collector.
Next, many courts will evaluate the adequacy of the remedy available
at law.75 Given the nature of the harm, money, where calculable, should
serve as an adequate remedy in all but exceptional cases. 76 But money
damages may prove speculative. To ascertain damages, the court would
first have to distinguish between permanent and non-permanent obstruc-
tions. An object not easily repairable or correctable-like a house-is a
permanent obstruction.7 7 Most cases of sunlight obstruction by structures
are likely to be permanent. Generally, the measure of damages for a per-
manent obstruction is the diminution in market value of the plaintiff's land
caused by the obstruction, 78 but that figure may be difficult to calculate.
Initially, appraisers will have little basis for determining the loss of value
because the market for solar homes is still limited in most areas of the coun-
try. The appraiser could attempt to value the cost of additional energy use
over the life of the obstructed building, but even that would be speculative.
Future energy prices are unpredictable. The percentage of the collector ac-
tually obscured may not be precise. And if there is actually some benefit to
the plaintiff from the obstruction, e.g., when the shade from the obstruction
would lower summer air conditioning costs, the plaintiffs recovery would
163 Conn. 1, 4, 301 A.2d 238, 241 (1973). See generaly D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES 341 (1973).
74. A solar access case will not involve personal injury, noxious odors, or un-
sightly conditions, conditions common in other types of nuisance cases in which
injunctions are issued.
75. See Drew Chem. Corp. v. Star Chem. Co., 258 F. Supp. 827, 835 (W.D. Mo.
1966); Missouri Fed'n of the Blind v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 505 S.W.2d 1, 10
(Mo. App., E.D. 1973).
76. See Nicholson v. Connecticut Halfway House, Inc., 153 Conn. 507, 512, 218
A.2d 383, 386 (1965) (depreciation of land values not ground for injunctive relief;
Johnson v. Independent School Dist., 239 Mo. App. 749, 756, 199 S.W.2d 421, 425
(Spr. 1947) (injunction denied even though no remedy at law); Robie v. Lillis, 112
N.H. 492, 495, 299 A.2d 155, 161 (1972) (law cannot protect homeowners from
fluctuating land values); Conner v. Smith, 433 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968) (remedy at law adequate for loss in value of property). There may be circum-
stances under which the monetary remedy would not be sufficient. For instance, if
the plaintiff lived in an outlying area with no other source of power available, the
court might issue an injunction against the obstruction since the harm was partly
non-economic.
77. See Patz v. Farmegg Prods., Inc., 196 N.W.2d 557, 563 (Iowa 1972) (large
chicken farm deemed permanent nuisance); City v. Tice, 517 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974) (sanitary landfill); Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 45 Wis. 2d 164,
175, 172 N.W.2d 647, 654 (1969) (electric utility power plant); see also Alabama
Great Southern Ry. v. Russell, 254 Ala. 701, 703, 48 So. 2d 249, 251 (1949).
78. Herbert v. Smyth, 155 Conn. 78, 85, 230 A.2d 235, 239 (1967).
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have to be decreased. 9 As more solar homes are built, however, appraisers
should be able to create reasonably uniform standards and there should be
fewer uncertainties in damage calculations. In the meantime, the specula-
tive calculations may weigh in favor of granting injunctive relief.
Another group of courts would not consider the adequacy of damages.
They reason that a nuisance that causes substantial injury to a neighbor
must be enjoined ° because an award of damages results in inverse condem-
nation.8 In effect, a defendant who pays damages for the nuisance is pay-
ing money in exchange for a right to obstruct in the future, which is the
equivalent of buying an easement for light from the plaintiff.8 2 This is
private condemnation of property. If, for example, a landowner en-
croached one foot onto an adjoining lot, these courts would not permit him
to pay damages to keep his house there.8 3 The solar cases can be distin-
guished, however, because the obstructor is not intruding onto his neigh-
bor's land; he is obstructing light from coming onto the land.84 Even so,
courts have held that nuisances, as interference with property rights, are not
susceptible to damages.8 5
Courts should rarely issue an injunction if the permanent obstruction is
79. Goble, supra note 61, at 40. The factors described in text are those peculiar
to solar access cases. Other traditional factors also must be evaluated in assessing
damages. See Pritchett v. Wade, 261 Ala. 156, 162, 73 So. 2d 533, 538 (1954) (eco-
nomic burden on defendant); Haack v. Lindsay Light & Chem. Co., 393 Ill. 367,
372, 66 N.E.2d 391, 394 (1946) (plaintiff's substantial interest); Stuart v. Lake
Wash. Realty Corp., 141 W. Va. 627, 655, 92 S.E.2d 891, 906 (1956) (defendant's
intent to cause harm); see generallp J. NINAN & W. LAWRENCE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
SOLAR ENERGY (1981); Comment, The Geomety of Solar Access, 16 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 263 (1976); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 601 (1971).
80. Fletchers Gin, Inc. v. Crihfield, 423 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1970) (land-
owner has right to enjoin nuisance); Crushed Stone v. Moore, 369 P.2d 811, 816
(Okla. 1962) (injunction granted to close rock quarry); Ellen v. City of Bryan, 410
S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (if nuisance is permanent, plaintiff entitled
to injunction regardless of remedy at law).
81. This is sometimes called "private eminent domain." See, e.g., Ottavia v.
Savarese, 338 Mass. 330, 335, 155 N.E.2d 432, 437 (1959) (supporting beams hung
over plaintiff's lot); see generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 997 (1965).
82. See Christensen v. Tucker, 114 Cal. App. 2d 554, 564, 250 P.2d 660, 663
(1952).
83. See, e.g., Geragosian v. Union Realty Co., 289 Mass. 104, 109, 193 N.E. 726,
728 (1935); Cutrona v. Columbus Theatre, 107 N.J. Eq. 281, 283, 151 A. 467, 468
(1930). Some courts will, however, permit the encroachment if it was made without
knowledge or intent to encroach. See, e.g., Oertel v. Copley, 152 Cal. App. 2d 287,
289, 313 P.2d 105, 107 (1957).
84. See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., 114 So. 2d
357, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (solar access differs from other encroachments
because plaintiff has no right to sunlight).
85. See Peterson v. Vak, 169 Neb. 441, 451, 100 N.W.2d 44, 51 (1959) (where
nuisance prevents substantial enjoyment, injunction is proper remedy); Marullo v.
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more valuable than the solar right, because the harm to the defendant out-
weighs the harm to the plaintiff. The solar collector's chief purpose is to
save money by lowering utility bills. The plaintiff thus can be fairly com-
pensated through a damage award. The plaintiff is not being bought
against his will, as he would be in the case of noxious odors or loud noises.
Instead, he is simply having money taken from one hand (his loss from the
solar collector) and put into the other (his recovery of damages). Allowing
an injunction under these circumstances could lead to little more than legal
extortion.
86
Balancing of the equities will be necessary as other courts evaluate the
nuisance cause of action created in Prah.87 That holding, which reverses
150 years of common law rejection of a right of solar access, may appear to
be a major step for a court to take. But the policy reasons supporting the
old doctrine no longer exist, and the law of nuisance is well adapted for
extension into the solar access area. Other American courts should follow
the lead of Prah and adopt a private nuisance right of action for solar access.
LEE J. HOLLIS
Chresafis, 48 Misc. 2d 53, 55, 264 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (court will
enjoin permanent nuisance).
86. See Keeton, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TEx. L. REV. 412, 416
(1940). If the court, for example, would order a $100,000 home torn down to pro-
tect $10,000 in savings to a solar collector, the defendant probably would be willing
to pay nearly $100,000 to the plaintiff to keep him from enforcing the injunction.
That payment, which bears no relationship to the magnitude of the plaintiff's loss,
is simply a windfall.
87. The Prah court was careful not to indicate its view of how the case should
be decided on the merits. It remanded the case, indicating that certain factors
could be taken into consideration: (1) Maretti's compliance with the applicable
zoning laws; (2) Prah's ability to have avoided the harm by putting his home in the
middle of his lot instead of near Maretti's property line; (3) the real extent of Prah's
harm; (4) the suitability of solar heat in the neighborhood; (5) the reasonableness of
Prah's remedies; and (6) the costs to Maretti in avoiding the harm. 108 Wis. 2d at
242, 321 N.W.2d at 192.
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